Cornell Law Review
Volume 65
Issue 1 November 1979

Article 3

Expanding the Role of the Patent Office in
Determining Patent Validity: A Proposal
Gregory Gelfand

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Gregory Gelfand, Expanding the Role of the Patent Office in Determining Patent Validity: A Proposal, 65 Cornell L. Rev. 75 (1979)
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr/vol65/iss1/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Cornell Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please
contact jmp8@cornell.edu.

EXPANDING THE ROLE OF THE
PATENT OFFICE IN DETERMINING
PATENT VALIDITY: A PROPOSAL
Gregory Gelfand t
[T]he primary responsibility for sifting out unpatentable material lies in the Patent Office. To await litigation is-for all practical purposes-to debilitate the patent system.'
A drastic reorganization of the present system for contesting
the validity of a patent is necessary. The Patent Office 2 is one of
the oldest American administrative agencies. To meet the needs
of our modern society, Congress has given most administrative
agencies decisionmaking and implementing powers, allowing recourse to the courts only for judicial review.4 In contrast, the
Patent Office acts largely as an initiating mechanism with little
control over the ultimate validity of a patent. 5 Today the central
t Assistant Professor of Law, University of Detroit. B.A. 1973, State University of
New York at Stonybrook; J.D. 1976, University of Michigan. The author would like to
express his appreciation to Professors Robert Choate and Howard Abrams for their criticisms and assistance in this project.
I Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 18 (1965).
2 The full name 6f the Patent Office is the Patent and Trademark Office, occasionally
abbreviated PTO. The term Patent Office is used throughout this Article.
3 See generally Federico, Outline of the History of the United States PatentOffice, 18 J. PAT.
OFF. Soc'y 63 (1936); see also Forman, The Birth of the American Patent System, 62 A.B.A.J.
1448 (1976).
The first Patent Act (ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109 (1790)) placed the administration of patents
with the Secretary of State. A new system was established in 1836 (ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117
(1836)) and modified in 1870 (ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198 (1870)) and 1952 (Pub. L. No. 593, ch.
950, 66 Stat. 792 (1952)). The administrative aspects of the patent system referred to in
this Article have remained essentially unchanged since 1836.
1 See generally K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT (1973). Consider, for example, the
gradual development of the Food and Drug Administration which at one time could only
bring an action in court to seize "misbranded" or "adulterated" products and now undertakes extensive pre-marketing review of all drugs. See Food and Drug Act of 1906, Pub. L.
No. 384, ch. 3915, 34 Stat. 768 (1906); Federal Fopd, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938,
Pub. L. No. 717, ch. 675, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (current version at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392
(1976)); J. MASHAW & A. MERRILL, INTRODUCTION TO THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW SYSTEM
459-542 (1975).
In FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 487 (1952) (dissenting opinion), Mr. Justice
Jackson commented: "The rise of administrative bodies probably has been the most significant legal trend of the last century and perhaps more values today are affected by their
decisions than by those of all the courts .... "
I See notes 118-119 and accompanying text infra. Most laymen expect that a patent,
once issued, is unassailable. In fact, a patent is little more than a ticket for admission to the
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issues of patent law are decided in the course of infringement
litigation scattered throughout the country. The federal district
courts, being crowded courts of general jurisdiction, have proven
an inappropriate forum for the complex process of testing patent
validity.
The Patent Office presently considers a patent application in
an ex parte proceeding.6 If the Office issues the patent, judicial
review of its validity 7 is available only through a full civil trial in
the federal district courts. Litigants can raise the issue there either
federal district courts. Once inside, the inventor supposedly has the presumption of validity
on his side. See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1976). But one study reports that the courts of appeals
held invalid 60 to 70 percent of the patents they considered over a 30 year period. Bjorge
& Behia, Patent ValiditylInvalidity Study, in U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP'T
OF COMMERCE, POLICY PLANNING STAFF PROJECT 73-2 (Apr. 3, 1974). One commentator has
argued that these figures are misleading. See Markey, The Status of the U.S. Patent SystemSans Myth, Sans Fiction, 59 J. PAT. OFF. SoC'Y 165 (1977). Markey, the Chief Judge of the
C.C.P.A., points out that between 1953 and 1971 only 0.1 per cent of all patents issued
were litigated before an appellate court, and that "[c]onclusions drawn from such a de
minimus sample in any other field would be laughed off the stage by trained statisticians."
Id. at 167. He also argues that the sample is unrepresentative as well as insignificant since
he feels only the weakest patents are likely to be attacked. Id. at 169. Even if the district
court decisions considering patent validity are added to the sample, however, only about 50
per cent of the patents litigated are upheld. See Chognard, Patent Litigation and Validity, 41
J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 291 (1959).
Professor Choate comments:
Against this background, we have the patent system, one of the main purposes of which is to encourage disclosure for the purpose of increasing public
knowledge and information. This is intended to allow free use by the public of
new inventions after the inventor has had exclusive protection for a limited
time. Why then would an inventor or originator of a new idea have any need to
rely on secrecy for protection? One reason may be that the invention may not
come up to the standards for patentability ....Another reason may lie in what
some observers consider an anti-patent trend in the courts. Protracted litigation
is time-consuming and extremely costly and, if the inventor is skeptical that the
validity of any patent he might obtain will be upheld, he may decide to take the
secrecy route.
An awareness of the trend toward greater reliance on trade secret protection should raise several important questions ....Is the trend desirable or not?
If not, what might the courts or the Patent Office do to discourage the trend?
R. CHOATE, PATENT LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS 7 (1973).
6 The exception to this rule comes into play when more than one inventor claims the
same idea, which is known as an "interference." See 35 U.S.C. § 135 (1976).
Some commentators have proposed funding of public interest intervenors to broaden
participation in administrative decision making. See, e.g., Cramton, The Why, Where and How
of Broadened Public Participationin the Administrative Process, 60 GEo. L.J. 525 (1972). This
proposal could have some application to the patent system. A publicly funded intervenor
charged with the duty of opposing patent applications at the ex parte stage might help
screen out many of the specious patents that are presently granted.
If the Office declines to issue the patent, judicial review is available in the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals. See, e.g., In re Meng, 429 F.2d 843 (C.C.P.A. 1974).
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as a defense in an infringement suit or directly in an action for
declaratory judgment. This system is exceedingly burdensome for
the individual inventor. The risk and expense it imposes have
seriously eroded the value of a patent. The unfortunate result is
likely to be a trend toward trade secret protection, through which
inventors will withhold their inventions from the public. 8
This Article proposes a mandatory post-issuance opposition
procedure within the Patent Office for litigating patent validity.

8 The basic purpose of the patent system is to encourage inventors to disclose their
ideas to the public. In exchange for disclosure the inventor receives a 17 year legal
monopoly. At the end of the 17 year period the idea becomes freely available. See Kewanee
Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480-81 (1974).
Trade secret protection, on the other hand, exists because the invention is undisclosed.
The idea will never become public property if the inventor can keep it secret. The law
protects such secrets by creating a cause of action against anyone who has contracted,
expressly or by implication, not to disclose the secret, as well as against anyone who obtains
the secret by unfair means. Tower Mfg. Co. v. Monsanto Chem. Works, 20 F.2d 386, 387
(S.D.N.Y. 1927).
An example might be found in the automobile battery industry. In theory, all lead-acid
storage batteries are chemically identical. Yet subtle changes in the physical design of the
surface of the plates make great differences in battery charge capacity. A great deal of
effort has gone into perfecting lead-acid storage battery design, yet the literature in the
field reveals very little. Manufacturers are holding their designs as trade secrets out of fear
that patents would not be upheld and publication would result in the loss of any competitive advantage from years of expensive research. It is difficult to estimate accurately how
much further advanced the storage battery would be today if such research were effectively
protected and freely circulated. It is also impossible to determine how much knowledge
would now be freely available following the expiration of patents that might have been
sought more than seventeen years ago.
Trade secret protection, a creation of state law, is arguably preempted by and inconsistent with the existence of federal patent law. This argument was presented to the Second
Circuit in Painton & Co. v. Bourns, Inc., 442 F.2d 216 (2d Cir. 1971). Judge Friendly was
not persuaded:
The other legal theory is that protecting trade secrets in advance of the
filing of patent applications is against public policy since it will discourage such
applications. The district court thought this to be true because, under Lear,
once a patent issues the patentee cannot force an unwilling licensee to pay
royalties until and unless the patent is determined to be valid. Hence, it is
claimed, an inventor will refrain from applying for a patent if he is allowed to
benefit from a trade secret license, and the public will be deprived of learning
of his invention. In analyzing this argument, it is useful to distinguish three
categories- (1) the trade secret believed by its owner to constitute a validly
patentable invention; (2) the trade secret known to its owner not to be so patentable; and (3) the trade secret whose valid patentability is considered dubious.
We think it rather fanciful to assume that in the first category there will be
a substantial withholding of patent application in favor of trade secret
agreements. A licensee will not pay as much for a license of unpatented knowhow, even if it be exclusive, which carries no protection against the world ....
The secret may leak, or be leaked in a way that cannot be proved to be a
breach of the agreement ....
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Such a procedure would allow anyone to challenge the validity of
a patent and would take most substantive patent law issues out of
the federal district courts. Judicial review-would be preserved
through provision for an appeal to the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals (C.C.P.A.), and ultimately to the Supreme Court.
Similar patent opposition or nullification proceedings are common
throughout the world. 9 One commentator 1 ° has described the
The second category affords even less reason for a rule invalidating trade
secret agreements .... There can be no public interest in stimulating developers of such know-how to flood an overburdened Patent Office with applications
for what they do not consider patentable ....
[Any case for such a rule must hinge on the third category-where the
inventor is doubtful whether he can get a patent or, at least, a valid one. While
a rule invalidating trade secret agreements might well have some tendency to
stimulate patent applications in this category, the beneficial effect even here is
by no means clear. If the patent does not issue, there will have been an unnecessary postponement in the divulging of the trade secret to person willing to
pay for it. If it does, it may well be invalid, yet many will prefer to pay a
modest royalty than to contest it ....
Id. at 223-25.
Consider the impact on this reasoning of a great decrease in the value of patent protection. At some point the balance shifts in favor of trade secret protection for inventions
in Judge Friendly's first and third categories. When that point is reached the policy of
disclosure embodied in the patent system conflicts directly with the nondisclosure promoted by trade secret protection. This Article asserts that the conflict is now worse than in
1971 when Judge Friendly wrote Painton. Despite substantial reduction in the value of
patent protection, however, the holding of Painton-thatthe federal patent law does not
preempt trade secret protection-remains law.
Judge Friendly's reasoning was adopted in Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S.
470 (1974). Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority, reasoned that "since there is no
real possibility that trade secret law will conflict with the federal policy favoring disclosure
of clearly patentable inventions partial pre-emption is inappropriate." Id. at 491-92. (The
Chief Justice spoke of "partial" preemption since certain aspects of trade secret law, such as
protection of customer lists, have nothing in common with patent law.) In view of the
trend, already emerging in 1974, toward trade secret protection, the Chief Justice's assertion appears untenable. Indeed, Justice Marshall, concurring, and Justice Douglas dissenting, both disagreed with the Chief Justice's initial assumption. Id. at 493-94, 495-99. Cf.
Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257 (1979) (no patent law preemption of
state contract law); Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973) (parallel case involving
federal copyright law preemption issues). Chief Justice Burger wrote the Quick Point,
Kewanee, and Goldstein opinions. For an exceptionally insightful criticism of Kewanee, see
Abrams & Abrams, Goldstein v. California:Sound, Fury, and Significance, 1975 Sup. CT. REv.
147, 178-81. Abrams and Abrams cogently argue that the Court's assumption of minimal
impact on federal law by state law is highly questionable, and that in any event the "minimal conflict" analysis employed represents an unfortunate departure from valid preemption doctrine.
9 For details on the operation of British, German, Japanese, and Swedish procedures,
see 4 AM. PAT. L. Ass'N Q.J. 86-229 (1976).
10 See, e.g., Rich, Forward and Comments on Post Issuance Reexamination, 4 AM. PAT. L.
AsS'N Q.J. 86 (1976). The author is Judge Giles S. Rich of the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals.
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use of opposition proceedings in the United States as "an idea
whose time has come.""
Nevertheless foreign procedures and
domestic proposals rarely go so far as the proposal made here,
which would make opposition proceedings the mandatory and
2
exclusive means for testing patent validity.'

1'Id. at 86.

12 A limited, optional, and voluntary opposition procedure now exists. This has not yet
become a significant part of the American patent law system. The Patent Office initially
held a "Trial Voluntary Protest Program" limited to 2,000 patent applications. See 924
OFFCIAL GAZErrE U.S. PAT. OFF. 2 (1974). The program was repeated on an increased
scale. Both programs operated as follows:
Protesters will have a period of three months running from date of publication of the notice in the Official Gazette in which to file their protest in the
Patent Office. Each protest must be filed in duplicate, and include the grounds
which the protester believes have a bearing on the patentability of any claim
contained in the published application. If the grounds are based on prior art,
the protest should include a copy of the prior art together with an explanation
of the relevance of such prior art to the allowed claims. In addition or alternatively, the protester will have the opportunity to comment on the manner in
which the prior art of record was applied and raise any other matter which may
affect the patentability of the claimed invention. In cases where prima fade
evidence is presented as to prior public use, proceedings set forth in Rule 292
will be used to provide the protester presenting such evidence with an opportunity to be heard. No extension of the three month period will be granted.
Id. These procedures are "limited" because they apply only to a certain number of patent
applications as a test, they are "optional" because the patentee may choose whether to have
his application made part of the text experience, and they are "voluntary" because an
infringer may ignore the protest system and raise patent invalidity as a defense in an
infringement action.
Congress has considered similar proposals. For example, S. 2255, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1975) expressly envisioned that patent validity would be challenged in traditional litigation
despite the availability of "reexamination" proceedings. S. 2255 provided, in part:
During the term of a patent, but not prior to twelve months after its issuance, nor during the pendency of any litigation concerning its validity or unen-

forceability, any person having an interest in the subject matter seeking to invalidate or limit the scope of or determine the patentability of any claim or
claims of such patent may, but shall not directly or indirectly be required by
any court or other body to request reexamination of such patent pursuant to
this section.
Id. § 135A (a)(1) (emphasis added). Other proposals have been even less drastic. See Lee,
Whither Patents: Drastic Surgery or Simple Therapy?, 62 A.B.A.J. 1150 (1976). One commen-

tator recently proposed a system that would enable the courts to refer a patent back to the
Patent Office if its validity was contested but would not create an affirmative duty to oppose before infringing. See Note, PatentQuality: An Analysis of Proposed Court, Legislative and
PTO-Administrative Reform-Reexamination Resurrected, 1978 Wis. L. REV. 1155, 1182-94.

Thus, it does not go as far as this Article's proposal. See notes 66-67, 104-111 and accompanying text infra. An affirmative duty to oppose is essential to the operation of the pro-
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The goals of the suggested reorganization are to bring about
greater efficiency and certainty in the evaluation of patents, save
the courts and litigants expense and time, promote national
uniformity in patent adjudication, and place patent practice in a
position of greater public scrutiny. By improving the quality of
patent evaluation the system should provide greater reward for
the true inventor, and discourage the unfortunate practice of
seeking patents of doubtful validity to frighten away legitimate
potential competitors.

THE PRESENT DILEMMA OF PATENT
VALIDITY ADJUDICATION

To appreciate the need for the proposed reorganization of
patent practice it is necessary to consider the origins and effects of
the dilemma that confronts a patent holder. Under the present
system the patentee is likely to lose whether or not he litigates to
defend his patent.
This dilemma is the product of the interaction and cumulative effect of six factors. First, there is a great deal of uncertainty
in the standard for "inventiveness" or "non-obviousness" that is
inherent in any attempt to accomplish the goals of a patent system. Second, there is a substantial de facto inconsistency in the
standards that are applied in the eleven judicial circuits. Third,
the recent elimination of the mutuality requirement for the application of collateral estoppel has accentuated existing inconsistencies. Fourth, the expansion of the availability of declaratory relief
has enabled infringers to take advantage of existing inconsistencies. Fifth, the cost of technical and expert testimony necessary to
defend patents has undermined their value. Sixth, the equitable
defense of laches has placed the patentee in the position where he
must take action that is costly and dangerous or risk losing his
right to patent protection.

posal. Awareness that a specious patent will be promptly opposed is certain to discourage
the practice of seeking patents for improper purposes. Further, this Article's proposal
eliminates forum-shopping by centralizing patent validity litigation at both the trial and
appellate levels. See notes 21-28 and accompanying text infra. It also promises to bring
patent office practice into line with judicial reality by having the courts act directly on the
Patent Office, and eases various other burdens that presently undermine the value of a
valid patent. See notes 64-65 and accompanying text infra.
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A. Uncertainty Inherent in the Standardfor Patentability

"[All improvement is not invention, and entitled to protection
as such."' 3 But it is very difficult to discriminate between those
improvements that justify a patent monopoly and those that do
not. To be patentable a device must be "novel." 14 This relatively
automatic test of whether an innovation was the first of its kind
does not, however, eliminate all non-patentable devices. The law
also requires "non-obviousness." ' 5 Unfortunately, this requirement is so indefinite that it fails to cure the question-begging nature of patent adjudication. We are still left with the basic question, "[g]ranted that an idea is novel, ...
does it have that quality
16
protection?"
warrants
which

13

Pearce v. Mulford, 102 U.S. 112, 118 (1880). See, e.g., In re Meng, 492 F.2d 843

(C.C.P.A. 1974). The invention found patentable involved the process of placing slices of
cheese on top of each other with a slight offset at the ends so that consumers could peel
off the slices more easily. The court conceded that the invention was embarrassingly simple, but held that it was nonobvious within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 103 and was therefore patentable. 492 F.2d at 849. The problem had hindered the marketing of sliced
cheese for many years. The court commented, "[o]f course the invention seems simple,
after the fact. But simplicity, particularly in an old and crowded art, may argue for rather
than against patentability." Id. at 848.
The better part of a treatise could be written on the history of the conflicts and contradictions that have arisen in American patent practice and, accordingly, no such effort
will be attempted here. See generally R. CHOATE, supra note 5, at 151-221, 291-371. The
problem is not unique to the American experience. For example, several European states
have recently joined together in the European Patents Convention. I.C. Baillie comments
on the European effort to reach a common definition of the standard to be applied:
Some interpretation problems can readily be seen in a multilingual treaty.
The term "inventive step" with its further explanation in Article 56 that an
invention involves an inventive step if, having regard to the state of the art, it is
not obvious to the person skilled in the art, may in fact be obscured by differences in the languages. None of the texts quite uses the language of any equivalent law-for instance, the German term "inventive height" is not used.
Moreover, the French text uses the term "invention activity." It seems clear that
the attempt has been made to avoid the "stroke of genius" concept and tests
as to the genesis of the invention, and also to avoid the language of the German law. However, it is clear that a wide range of concepts of "inventive step"
could exist. Here again we can expect generation of a new body of law not
following any of the present European laws.
Baillee, Where Goes Europe? The European Patent, 58 J. PAT. OFF. SoC'y 153, 165 (1976).
14 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1976).
15 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1976). The statutory requirement of non-obviousness was added in
1952. Prior to that time the case law had evolved a similar requirement. See Graham v.
John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 3-4 (1965).
16 R. CHOATE, supra note 5, at 291 (emphasis added). For an interesting alternative
approach, see Wyman, Merwin on Invention and 35 U.S.C. 103, 42 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 814
(1960). Wyman suggests that "invention" is the product of imagination, and not reasoning.
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The conclusory definitions that courts have given to "invention" reflect this indefiniteness. Invalidating the patent before it,
one court stated that the innovation at issue was "nothing more
than the exercise of ordinary mechanical skill." 17 Another declared
that "[t]o grant ... a monopoly of every slight advance made ... is
unjust." t8 A third admitted that "[to] say that [a patentable invention] is a product of intuition, or of something akin to genius, as
distinguished from mere mechanical skill, draws one ... nearer
... but ... does not adequately express the idea."' 9 -Although
these phrases may convey a sense of what "invention" is, they are
hardly workable definitions.20

Compare Cuno Engineering Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84 (1941):
Chicago Steel Foundry Co. v. Burnside Steel Foundry Co., 132 F.2d 812 (7th Cir. 1943,
See also Hallman, Creativity, Patentability and Nonobviousness, 57 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 320
(1975). Hallman, a philosophy professor, suggests that "creativity" is the essence of invention.

Nevertheless, the courts have developed a series of "objective" tests to help determine
patentability. Five such tests are most commonly used. First, did the invention satisfy a
long-felt need in the area? Second, were significant efforts made to accomplish the same
result unsuccessful? Third, were those skilled in the art skeptical about the success of the
invention? Fourth, were the results of the invention surprising in impact or effectiveness?
Fifth, has the invention been commercially successful? See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383
U.S. 1 (1965); R. CHOATE, supra note 5, at 369-71; Note, Subtests of Nonobviousness: A NonTechnical Approach to Patent Validity, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 1169 (1964).
None of these tests, however, are determinative. For example, if someone invents a
completely new product, there may well be no long-felt need for it. No one would have
ever considered it before. Judge Learned Hand expressed the frustration these tests have
caused the courts in E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co. v. Glidden, 67 F.2d 392 (2d Cir.
1933).
There are indeed expressions in the books which, taken literally, would exclude
such work from the protection of the patent laws; there are others which would
not. But we deprecate such a priori rules for determining invention. Nothing
has tended more to confuse and obscure the issue than the attempts of courts
to lay down generalities. The issue does not admit of such treatment, for invention is always a function of the particular situation.... That this is a treacherous standard is true enough, but at least it is less treacherous than easy absolutes which fit the immediate occasion, but lie athwart any realistic treatment in
the next case.
Id. at 395.
17 Pearce v. Mulford, 102 U.S. 112, 117 (1880) (emphasis added).
s Atlantic Works v. Brady, 107 U.S. 192, 200 (1882) (emphasis added).
'9 McClain v. Ortmayer, 141 U.S. 419, 426-27 (1891) (emphasis added).
20 Hindsight poses another problem. The inventions of 10 years ago seem obvious today. Some inventions seem obvious after only a day. The proper test for non-obviousness
under 35 U.S.C. § 103 is whether the invention was obvious when it was invented. It is
difficult for federal district judges who lack expertise in patent law to avoid finding an
invention obvious when, at the time of litigation, it clearly is obvious. See, e.g., United States
Expansion Bolt Co. v. Jordan Indus., Inc., 346 F. Supp. 541, 544-45 (E.D. Pa. 1972). The
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The difference between invention and novelty is not just a
matter of degree; the two are distinct concepts. Hypothetically, if
an inventor creates a 62.534867 watt light bulb, it will probably be
the first of its kind and therefore "novel." Uniqueness for its own
sake, however, does not justify a patent monopoly. On the other
hand, if that light bulb has just the right power to make roses
grow indoors at fantastic rates, it might have "that quality" necessary to make it patentable.
These extreme examples fall neatly into the appropriate
categories, but intermediate situations are less readily classifiable.
Patent cases tend to involve complex fact patterns, many of which
defy pigeon-holing. 2 1 The uncertainty this creates may be inherent in any system that judges each invention individually. In
American practice, however, the multiplicity of forums for patent
adjudication compounds the problem, because the various courts
apply these uncertain standards inconsistently.
B. Inconsistency Between the Judicial Circuits
It is often said that certain of the circuits are "pro-" and
others "anti-" patents.2 2 Studies of patent litigation reveal a
shocking correlation between fact and rumor-over a ten year
period from 1961 to 1970, Horn and Epstein report that while
the Tenth Circuit upheld sixty-eight per cent of the patents litigated before it, the Eighth Circuit upheld only ten per cent, and

court found "that the prior art.., does not teach or equal plaintiff's patented combination" but held that "such a slight modification as the rounding of the screw thread of a nail
of otherwise known configuration would be obvious to an ordinary tradesman having ordinary skill in the art."
2 1 An added advantage of centralizing the patent law system, as proposed in this Article, is that the forum for adjudicating patent validity will gain the broadest possible exposure to such fact patterns. In contrast, the typical federal district judge, who tries only
occasional patent cases, does not get a fair exposure to the factual complexity of the issues
he decides.
22 See Codex Corp. v. Milgo Elec. Corp., 553 F.2d 735, 738 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 860 (1977): "[It is well known that the patent bar believes that the hospitality accorded patents varies markedly from circuit to circuit" (footnote omitted). In the course of
preparing this Article, the author interviewed numerous practicing patent attorneys in the
Detroit area. All of them commented on this, but from different perspectives. Almost
without exception, patent attorneys who represented corporate clients indicated that they
were not terribly concerned with the failings of the patent system. On the other hand,
attorneys who represented individual inventors all expressed great concern and indicated
that they frequently found themselves practicing more trade secret law than patent law.
Corporate attorneys may favor the present system because it provides the large ongoing
companies with the free research that small inventors who cannot adequately defend their
patents provide.
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the D.C. Circuit upheld none.2 3 The other circuits fell between
these two figures. 2 4 Another study has reached similar conclusions.2 5
23 Horn & Epstein, The Federal Courts' View of Patents-A Different View, 55 J. PAT. OFF.
Soc'Y 134, 146 (1973).
24 The Court of Claims (sitting in cases where the United States was sued) upheld as
many as 65 per cent of the patents litigated before it over the ten year period, while the
Seventh Circuit upheld 53 per cent, the Fifth Circuit upheld 46 per cent, the Sixth Circuit
upheld only 37 per cent, the First Circuit upheld only 35 per cent, the Fourth Circuit
upheld only 33 per cent, the Ninth Circuit upheld only 26 per cent, the Second Circuit
upheld only 24 percent, and the Third Circuit upheld only 14 per cent of the patents
litigated before it.
The study is suspect because too few patent cases reach the courts of appeals in a ten
year period to provide a statistically sound base for drastic conclusions. There were 669
cases during the ten year period.
25 See Baum, The Federal Courts and Patent Validity: An Analysis of the Record, 56 J. PAT.
OFF. Soc'Y 758, 762 (1974). Baum's study covers the period from 1961 to 1973. Compare
Lang & Thomas, Dispositionof Patent Cases by Courts During the Period 1939-1949, 32 J. PAT.
OFF. Soc'Y 803 (1950), reaching rather indecisive results over that earlier period. In recent
years, however, the record appears to support Horn and Epstein's conclusions clearly. Consider, for example, the random selection of cases discussed in this article where more than
one circuit has considered the same patent. In Graham v. John Deere Co. 383 U.S. I
(1965), the patent was found valid in the Fifth Circuit, but invalid in the Eighth. Horn and
Epstein would have predicted this, as the Fifth Circuit upheld 46 per cent during the ten
year period and the Eighth Circuit only upheld 10 per cent. In Blonder-Tongue
Laboratories v. University of Ill. Foundation, 402 U.S. 313 (1971), the Seventh Circuit (53
per cent upheld during the study) found the patent valid, while the Eighth Circuit (10 per
cent) found it invalid. Similarly in Blumcraft of Pittsburgh v. Kawneer Co., 482 F.2d 542
(5th Cir. 1973), the patent was found valid in the Court of Claims (65 per cent upheld)
and invalid in the Fourth Circuit (33 per cent upheld). In Monsanto Co. v. Dawson Chem.
Co. 443 F.2d 1035 (5th Cir. 1971), the Third Circuit held the patent invalid (14 per cent
upheld), and the district court in the Fifth Circuit (46 per cent upheld) found the patent
valid as Horn and Epstein would have predicted. The district court reached the merits of
the case, and may reasonably be presumed to have been following the general tenor of
Fifth Circuit decisions. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, but not on the merits.
In the time between the district court's decision and the appeal the Blonder-Tongue decision came down from the Supreme Court and mandated that the Fifth Circuit follow the
earlier holding of invalidity regardless of how it would have decided it had reached the
merits.
The only case in the group that happened to be considered in the course of this
Article that apparently does not support Horn and Epstein is Jamesbury Corp. v. Litton
Indus. Prods., Inc., 586 F.2d 917 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 1503 (1979). The
patent in Jamesbury was found valid, as Horn and Epstein would have predicted, in the
Court of Claims (65 per cent upheld). A subsequent decision of the Second Circuit (24 per
cent upheld) did not follow Horn and Epstein's trend by finding the patent invalid. However, Horn and Epstein did not predict that the Second Circuit was so strongly "anti-"
patent that it would never find a patent valid. Moreover, the patent involved in the case
appears to have been a very strong patent on the merits, as the Second Circuit's opinion
indicates, and several other actions pending in circuits throughout the country had been
settled favorably following the finding of validity in the Court of Claims. In this factual
context, the district court in the Second Circuit had granted a summary judgment of invalidity on a rather technical defense. The Second Circuit held no more than that sum-
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The inconsistency of the circuits invites forum-shopping; 2 6
the law in the Tenth Circuit is much more inviting to a patentee
than that in the Eighth Circuit. If the patent system is to encourage inventors to disclose their inventions, rather than practicing
them as trade secrets 2 7 the system must offer some promise of
reward. How well does the present system with its inconsistencies
serve this function? Judge Rich of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals has commented on this problem:
It sometimes reminds me of a lottery. People do buy lottery
tickets because of their gambling propensities and because the
winners get a lot of publicity. There is a bit of that in the patent system. But the point about lotteries is that the tickets are
cheap. Patents are not .... 28
The differences among the circuits take on special importance in
light of the factors considered below.
C. The Expansion of CollateralEstoppel.
Triplett v. Lowell 2 9 set forth the rule that a prior judgment of
mary judgment striking down the patent would be used seldom if ever when a patent had
been earlier found valid in another circuit.
Additional support for Horn and Epstein's survey may be inferred from the forumshopping cases that happen to appear in this Article. In Rayco Mfg. Co. v. Chicopee Mfg.
Corp., 148 F. Supp. 588 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), the infringer was trying to maneuver the case
into the Second Circuit (only 24 per cent upheld); in William Gluckin & Co. v Int'l Playtex
Corp., 407 F.2d 177 (2d Cir. 1969), the infringer was also trying to maneuver into the
Second Circuit; in Skil Corp. v. Millers Falls Co., 541 F.2d 554 (6th Cir. 1976), the infringer was trying to maneuver into the Sixth Circuit (only 32 per cent upheld); in Codex
Corp. v. Milgo Elec. Corp., 553 F.2d 735 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 860 (1977), the
infringer was trying to get into the First Circuit (only 35 per cent upheld), while the patentee was trying to bring the same case in the Tenth Circuit (68 per cent upheld); in Mattel,
Inc. v. Louis Mary & Co., 353 F.2d 421 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 384 U.S. 948 (1965), the
infringer was trying to get into the Second Circuit; and in Helene Curtis Indus. v. Sales
Affiliates, 105 F. Supp. 886 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd 199 F.2d 732 (2d Cir. 1952), the infringer was
also trying to get into the Second Circuit. None of these cases were selected for this Article
for the purposes of supporting Horn and Epstein's survey; the correlation appeared after
the Article was drafted.
26 The proposed Federal Court Improvement Act, S. 1477, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., § 301
(1979), would eliminate this problem. The bill centralizes patent litigation appeals from
district courts in one expanded court which would assume the functions of the C.C.P.A.
Although this would improve the present system, many problems would remain: For
example inconsistency among district courts, the high cost of litigation, the unfair impact
of collateral estoppel, and initial decision making by district court judges whose contact
with patent cases is sporadic and inefficient.
27 See note 8 and accompanying text supra.
28 Rich, How Systematic Is the Patent System?, 57 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 696, 697 (1975).
Compare the comments of Chief Judge Markey of the same court, note 122 infra.
29 297 U.S. 638 (1936).
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the invalidity of a patent does not bar a subsequent suit on the
same patent against another defendant. The Court observed:
Neither reason nor authority supports the contention that an
adjudication adverse to any or all claims of a patent precludes
another suit upon the same claims against a different defendant. While the earlier decision may by ,-omity be given great
weight in a later litigation and thus persuade the court to render a like decree, it is not res adjudicata and may not be
pleaded as a defense."0
Thus, the inconsistencies among the circuits were largely mitigated in that a loss to one infringer could be offset by victories
against others. Of course this had the peculiar result that two
manufacturers could make the same item side by side while only
one paid royalties.
The Court attempted to prevent such anomolies in BlonderTongue Laboratoriesv. University of Illinois Foundation,3 l by abandoning Triplett and rejecting the requirement of mutuality for collateral estoppel. With this holding the Court followed a growing
trend in state law 3 2 which recognized that mutuality allowed
some litigants more than one "day in court."
The Court's decision has some merit from the perspective of
patent law; if one litigant has more than one day in court, another
who has not had a first opportunity is kept waiting. Unfortunately, in Blonder-Tongue the Court assaulted a problem that demands a legislative solution. Only Congress can change the entire
structure of the patent system in a comprehensive and controlled
way; judicial power is more limited. In preventing multiple inconsistent adjudications of the same patent, the Court removed a

30 Id. at 642.
31 402 U.S. 313 (1971). Blonder-Tongue dealt with "defensive" use of collateral estoppel,

the use of collateral estoppel by a defendant as a "shield" to block a plaintiff's claim. In
Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979), the Supreme Court sanctioned "offensive" use of collateral estoppel, the use of collateral estoppel by the plaintiff to assert his
claim. In the patent law area only defensive collateral estoppel is a major tool; infringers
use it to bar a losing patentee from asserting his claim again. In an unusual case where a
patentee who has lost in a prior action is still threatening to sue on the patent, an "infringer" might conceivably use collateral estoppel "offensively" in a declaratory judgment
suit, or possibly even in a harassment or malicious prosecution action. The author has
found no such case.
32 See, e.g., Bernhard v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122
P.2d 892 (1942) (opinion by Traynor, J.); Coca Cola Co. v. Pepsi-Cola Co., 36 Del. 124,
172 A. 260 (Super. Ct. 1934).
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check on the unfairness resulting from the conflicting biases of
the different circuits. It also created a variety of other problems.
Consider a hypothetical railroad crash which injures 134 passengers. 33 All of them file lawsuits against the company (as does
Mrs. Palsgraf, standing on the platform). The first to litigate must
pay for the detailed proof that a computer operated signaling device failed. The litigation will drag on as various plaintiff's lawyers
graciously allow each other to go first. Justice is still delayed, but
for a new reason.
The "rule of anomaly" poses an even more troublesome problem. If the railway wins the first thirteen cases but loses the fourteenth, it may have to pay all the rest despite the first thirteen
wins. 34 As the Court commented in Jeter v. Hewitt, "res judicata

33 See Currie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel: Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine, 9 STAN. L.
REv. 281 (1957). Professor Currie employs this hypothetical but with only 50 victims. An
airplane or train accident could easily involve more.
Another interesting problem in this area occurs when actions are pending concurrently
and one party has the option to choose which action (or appeal) to pursue first. Consider
Monsanto Co. v. Dawson Chem. Co., 443 F.2d 1035 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S.
974 (1972).
The Monsanto litigation points up some of the problems that Blonder-Tongue
will require courts to face. The suits against Dawson Chemical and Rohn &
Haas were filed the same day: The patent was found invalid by the Pennsylvania court on February 17, 1970, 312 F. Supp. 778, 164 U.S.P.Q. 556. It was
then found valid by the Texas District Court on April 14, 1970, 312 F. Supp.
452, 164 U.S.P.Q. 560. The Pennsylvania District Court denied a motion for
amended findings and a partial retrial on May 21, 1970, 312 F. Supp. 798, 165
U.S.P.Q. 683. The Fifth Circuit then reversed the Texas holding ...on June 8,
1971. The Pennsylvania decision was still subject to appeal and possible reversal
at this point.
R. CHOATE, supra note 5, at 865.
34 The train disaster hypothetical illustrates this problem, but it is not perfectly analogous to the typical patent case. The railroad is faced with automatic multiple liability due to
offensive use of collateral estoppel. Only defensive use is likely to arise in patent litigation.
See note 31 supra. After Parklane, however, this distinction has minimal practical effect. See
note 31 supra.
Professor Currie suggests that once a victory has been won by the patentee, a subsequent loss could not reasonably be interpreted as the patentee's "fair opportunity to defend." Thus, the rule enunciated in Bernhard and Blonder-Tongue might be read as limited
by good common sense to situations where the patentee has lost in his first action. Currie,
supra note 33, at 286-89, 322. One commentator, writing over fifty years ago, considered
the rule of the anomaly acceptable. See Comment, Privity and Mutuality in the Doctrine of Res
Judicata, 35 YALE L.J. 607 (1926).
Currie's analysis, which makes eminently good sense, has lost out in the patent field.
See Jamesbury Corp. v. Litton Indus. Prods., Inc., 586 F.2d 917, 921 n.9 (2d Cir. 1978)
(dictum), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 1503 (1979):
Incidentally, if we were to affirm the District Court, appellant presumably
would be estopped from suing any other infringer under Blonder-Tongue
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renders white that which is black, and straight that which is
35
crooked."
This problem is far more acute in patent law because of the
inconsistencies involved in patent adjudication. Prior to Blonder-

Laboratories,Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313 .... even though
there would then be one decision in favor of the validity of the patent and one
decision against-a tie score.
See Blumcraft of Pittsburgh v. Kawneer Co., 482 F.2d 542 (5th Cir. 1973). One comment in
Blumcraft, however, suggests that the court would take Currie's approach in an extreme
case:
We are not blind to the potential "problems" inherent in our decision, but
we believe that through the proper application of Blonder-Tongue these problems can be satisfactorily resolved. For instance, under our ruling today it
would be technically possible to apply collateral estoppel where a prior finding
of invalidity was preceded by several rather than by just one finding of validity.
In such instances there would be a red flag warning a court to apply the full
and fair criteria very carefully to determine if the court finding the patent
invalid had adequately comprehended and applied the appropriate substantive
standards.
Id. at 548 (footnote omitted). But the court took this position hesitantly:
Ultimately, of course, there is appeal to the Supreme Court from the finding of
invalidity; and, while we recognize the apparent difficulty in obtaining relief
through this channel, we cannot predicate an exception to a rule mandated by
the Supreme Court on the basis of our assessment of the Court's future performance. In any event, the "injustice" to the patentee in such cases is no
greater and in fact is arguably less than in a situation such as Blonder-Tongue,
where the determination of invalidity came prior to any validity rulings. In
Blonder-Tongue, despite the explicit fact that, absent the application of collateral
estoppel, further successful suits on the patent would have been possible after
the first unsuccessful suit, the Supreme Court sanctioned, and ultimately the
Seventh Circuit allowed collateral estoppel to be applied. It follows that the fact
of a prior successful suit, as here, should not, in itself, be permitted to undermine the numerous policy reasons expounded in Blonder-Tongue in favor of
applying estoppel.
Id. at 548-49. The opinion sheepishly concluded:
If litigation were costless, both to the litigants and to society, it might be
desirable never to allow collateral estoppel to preclude a new lawsuit. But as
with most mortal endeavors, litigation is not so blessed. Collateral estoppel is a
rule of repose and as such it is not always pure or just or even cognitive. Efficiency and economy in judicial administration have their places in our judicial
schema.
Id. at 549. See also Technograph Printed Circuits Ltd. v. Martin Marietta Corp., 474 F.2d
798 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 880 (1973) (patent held valid by House of Lords
and invalid in United States).
" 63 U.S. (22 How.) 352, 364 (1859). Notably, however, there are cases suggesting an
approach which complements the collateral estoppel effect of Blonder-Tongue. The theory
of these cases, some of which precede Blonder-Tongue, is that patent validity is an issue of
law and a decision upholding the patent will "bind" subsequent infringers through stare
decisis. See, e.g., Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Foster Grant Co., 547 F.2d 1300, 1302-03 (7th
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 929 (1977):
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Tongue, "the courts, which ultimately applied the same law to the
same facts, were reaching incongruous conclusions." 36 In
Blonder-Tongue itself, the Eighth Circuit had found the patent at
issue invalid in University of Illinois Foundation v. Winegard,37 but
the Seventh Circuit found it valid in University of Illinois Foundation
v. Blonder-Tongue Laboratories.8 Blonder-Tongue may establish a

In 1967 this court considered the waste of effort involved in repeated full
scale trials and considerations of validity of a patent, and held that once there
has been a judicial determination of validity, the party challenging validity in a
later action in the same court has the burden of presenting "persuasive new
evidence" of invalidity and demonstrating that there is a "material distinction"
between the cases. American Photocopy Equipment Co. v. Rovico, 384 F.2d 813,
815-16 (7th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 945... The Rovico rule was recently explained and reaffirmed in Mercantile Nat'l Bank of Chicago v. Hounnet
Corp., 524 F.2d 1031, 1032 (7th Cir. 1975). The court said, "[flor reasons of
stability in the law and judicial economy, we ordinarily will not reexamine de
novo the decision of the court in the prior case but rather will limit ourselves to
a consideration of whether, assuming the correctness of the earlier decision,
additional facts not before the court in the prior case require a different result.
This is but an application of the doctrine of stare decisis."
The Ninth Circuit followed this view in a trademark case where the issues were similar
(Pachmayr Gun Works v. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp., 502 F.2d 802 (9th Cir. 1974)).
and the Eighth Circuit has stated that it follows such a rule (Imperial Stone Cutters, Inc. v.
Schwartz, 370 F.2d 425 (1977) (pre-Blonder-Tongue action in which sufficient new evidence
was found to invalidate patent previously held valid)).
Other circuits do not appear to follow such a rule. See, e.g., Blumcraft of Pittsburgh v.
Kawneer Co., 482 F.2d 542 (5th Cir. 1973); Boutell v. Volk, 449 F.2d 673 (10th Cir. 1971).
The Boutell court reasoned:
In any event, there is nothing in the very careful opinion of Mr. Justice White
[in Blonder-Tongue] which in any way intimates that the patentee is free to obtain a judgment of validity and thrust it upon non-participating parties in other
litigation. To do so would be contrary to the very matters which were weighed
and considered in arriving at the final conclusion in Blonder-Tongue.
Id. at 678.
6 O'Rourke, Do Unto Others Before They Do Unto You Or: Current Trends in Declaratory
Judgments, 57 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 541, 541 (1975). See notes 22-23 and accompanying text
supra.
37 402 F.2d 125 (8th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 917 (1969).
38 422 F.2d 769 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1061 (1972). Apparently several

other patent conflict cases were also pending at the time Blonder-Tongue was decided. See
Technograph Printed Circuits Ltd. v. Martin Marietta Corp., 474 F.2d 798, 811 n.28 (4th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 880 (1973); Monsanto Co. v. Dawson Chemical Co., 443
F.2d 1035 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 974 (1972). In Monsanto, the court noted:
At the time the court below concluded that it was not relieved by the
Pennsylvania judgment of the 'judicial travail" of reaching its own decision on
the merits, it was completely correct.
However, the proverbial slip twixt the cup and the lip occurred. On May 3,
1971, many months after the court below engaged in its ordeal of decision, and
indeed, after oral argument to this court, the Supreme Court with unanimous

wisdom reversed its earlier holding in Triplett. The Court ruled that a patent
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But in the patent area it creates,

in effect, a post-issuance opposition proceeding which can strike
down a patent permanently according to any of eleven inconsistent legal standards.
Now a patent is valid until invalid. Thus a patentee may successfully surmount attacks on his property in nine circuits; however, if 0the tenth finds it invalid the prior victories are for
4
naught.
D. The Increased Availability of DeclaratoryJudgments

Congress enacted the Declaratory Judgment Act 4' in 1934,
one year after the Supreme Court upheld a similar state law in.

owner is bound by the judgment of patent invalidity in a prior suit against a
different defendant .... Blonder-Tongue Laboratories v. University of Illinois Foundation ....
443 F.2d at 1037.
Even in cases of direct conflict the Court has often ignored patent issues. For example,
in Blumcraft of Pittsburgh v. Kawneer Co., 482 F.2d 542 (5th Cir. 1973), the Supreme
Court denied Blumcraft's repeated petitions for certiorari in spite of the conflict between
the Fourth Circuit and the Court of Claims concerning the validity of the Blumcraft patent.
Id. at 544-45.
From the Supreme Court's perspective, the Blonder-Tongue rule was a way to reduce its
caseload by apparently ending such circuit conflicts over patents. The decision may have
reflected the Court's assessment of the importance of patent cases as compared to others
that vie for its limited attention. It may also be an indication of the Justices' disdain for
cases involving technical information beyond their comprehension. Former Supreme Court
Justice Fortas commented:
Many federal appellate judges-perhaps most of them-approach patents with
the kind of suspicion and hostility that a city-bred boy feels when he must
traverse a jungle full of snakes. The patent system is strange and weird
territory to most judges. They have never seen anything that resembles it. All
patents look more or less strange and threatening to them; and since they are
heavily armed with the power of the U.S. Government they frequently get the
idea that it's their duty to kill everything that moves in this dangerous land.
Fortas, The Patent System in Distress, 14 IDEA 571, 571 (1971).
39 See Currie, Civil Procedure: The Tempest Brews, 53 CALIF. L. REv. 25 (1965). For other
comments on the Blonder-Tongue rule, see Halpern, Blonder-Tongue: A Discussion and
Analysis, 53 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 761 (1971); Kahn, Blonder-Tongue and the Shape of Future
Patent Litigation, 53 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 581 (1971); Smith, The CollateralEstoppel Effect of a
PriorJudgment of Patent Invalidity: Blonder-Tongue Revisited, 55 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 286 (1973);
Note, Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation: Mutuality of
Estoppel-A Final Eulogy, 5 IND. LEGAL F. 208 (1971); Note, Blonder-Tongue: Abrogation of
Mutuality Requirementsfor Defensive Use of CollateralEstoppel in Patent Infringement Suits, 33 U.
PiTT. L. REv. 287 (1971); Comment, Blonder-Tongue Bites Back: Collateral Estoppel in Patent
Litigation-A New Look, 18 VILL. L. REv. 207 (1972).
" O'Rourke, supra note 36, at 542.
41 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1976) states:
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Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Railwav v. Wallace.42 The purpose of the Act was to provide a prospective remedy for people
who wished to know their rights before taking the risks necessary
43
to make an issue ripe for a settlement in a traditional lawsuit.
This is particularly important in patent law because gearing up to
produce a patented item often involves enormous production,
advertisement, and distribution costs which arise before the product reaches the market and comes to the attention of the patentee.
When President Washington first asked the Supreme Court
to give advice, it categorically refused, on questionable
grounds. 4 4 The American courts, faithful to this precedent, orig-

In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction ... any court of the United
States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and
other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether
or not further relief is or could be sought. Any such declaration shall have the
force and effect of a final judgment or decree and shall be reviewable as such.
28 U.S.C. § 2202 (1976) further states:
Further necessary or proper relief based on a declaratory judgment or decree
may be granted, after reasonable notice and hearing, against any adverse party
whose rights have been determined by such judgment.
42 288 U.S. 249 (1933).
43 But see note 71 and accompanying text infra. Such a person may not have standing to
obtain a declaratory judgment.
44 In July 1793, President Washington needed legal advice concerning America's rights
and duties as a neutral in the European War then in progress. Acting on his behalf, Secretary of State Jefferson submitted a series of specific questions to the Justices. In a letter
that accompanied these questions, Jefferson urged that a response would "secure us against
errors dangerous to the peace of the United States" and that the Justice's authority would
"assure the respect of all parties." Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Chief Justice Jay (July
18, 1793), reprinted in 3 CORRESPONDENCE AND PUBLIC PAPERS OF JOHN JAY 486 (H.
Johnston ed. 1891). Chief Justice Jay refused the request, suggesting that compliance
would violate the constitutional scheme of separation of powers. See Letter from Chief
Justice Jay to President Washington (Aug. 8, 1793), reprinted in id. at 488-89. See generally P.
BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 64-70 (2d ed. 1973).
Professors Gunther and Dowling suggest two credible justifications for the Court's inaction. First, advisory opinions would place the Court in a position where its ability to act
as the "sober second thought of the community, appraising action already taken, rather
than as advisors in the front line of governmental action" would be lost. Second, giving
advisory opinions would subject the Court to political attack. See G. GUNTHER & N. DowLING, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 67 (8th ed. 1970). A rule allowing judicial discretion might serve
these objectives equally well. The courts could be free to give decisions in advance of potential errors when practical. In fact, the law of declaratory judgments, while still paying lip
service to earlier doctrine, has probably reached this point. See notes 49-50 and accompanying text infra.
The constitutions of several states allow advisory opinions without any evident disastrous effects. See generally Field, The Advisory Opinion-An Analysis, 24 IND. L.J. 203 (1949);
Note, JudicialDeterminations in Nonadversary Proceedings, 72 HARV. L. REv. 723 (1959).
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inally disfavored the declaratory judgment as a back-door route to
an advisory opinion. 45 Courts have analyzed such issues in terms
of the constitutional grant of judicial authority to hear "cases and
controversies." 46 The term "controversies" suggests only that
something tangible should be at stake between two parties. Contrary to sound statutory construction techniques, however, the
Court has read the term "controversies" as superfluous: "The
term 'controversies,' if distinguishable at all from 'cases,' is so in
that it is less comprehensive than the latter and includes only suits
of a civil nature .... ,
In Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Haworth,4 s however, the Court
upheld the new Declaratory Judgment Act, claiming that it only
affected the procedural posture of cases and controversies that
might otherwise be brought. The transparency of this reasoning
suggests that impracticality has been the death of the earlier cases
and controversies doctrine. The failure of the Court to give the
doctrine a decent burial, on the other hand, left a lingering confusion that has come to light with continued use of the Act.
Aetna suggested that the constitutional requirement of a case
or controversy must still be met before the declaratory judgment
option will be available to litigants. Taken literally, this requirement would undo the purpose of allowing declaratory
judgments-to give litigants a definition of their rights before they
incur costs associated with getting to the point of conflict. To fulfill this function, courts have become increasingly liberal in their
examination of complaints for allegations of controversy. A patent
litigant can now become eligible for a declaratory judgment
merely by alleging that a defendant has either directly or indirectly accused him of inducing or contributing to an infringement.4 9 Even conservative statements in the patent area evince a
retreat from the original concept:

4 See O'Rourke, supra note 36, at 551.
" See, e.g., Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911).
47 Id. at 356-57.
48 300 U.S. 227 (1937).
'9 See, e.g., Wembley, Inc. v. Superba Cravats, Inc., 315 F.2d 87 (2d Cir. 1963); Thiokol
Chem. Corp. v. Burlington Indus., 319 F. Supp. 218 (D. Del. 1970), aff'd, 448 F.2d 1328
(3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1019 (1972). The Wembley court allowed an action
prior to actual manufacture, emphasizing the plaintiff's intent:
[I]t would be economically wasteful to require a plaintiff to embark on an actual program of manufacture, use of sale which may turn out to be illegal; on
the other hand, a vague and unspecific "desire" to practice an invention if a
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The touchstone is a reasonable apprehension. There must be, in
other words, some concrete indication that the defendant
patentee claims the plaintiff's activity infringes his patent, and
also that he will50 act affirmatively to enforce the protection
which he claims.

At least one writer is highly critical of this recent liberality because
of its impact on the patent law. 51 Nevertheless, the new approach
to declaratory relief is entirely reasonable; its use in the patent
system is unfortunate only because the inconsistency among the
circuits in applying patent law creates an incentive for forum
shopping. In patent litigation a range of forum choices is typically
available. If a patent is commercially successful enough that the
parties are going to court over it, it is likely that the parties have
become large enough to be present in more than one circuit. The
result is perhaps best described by the tragicomic title of a recent
patent article: Do Unto Others Before TheT Do Unto You Or: Current
Trends in DeclaratoryJudgments.5 2
In one case, the judge felt compelled to comment:
I find these tactics deplorable. That the issuance of a patent
should be tantamount to the blowing of a starter's whistle in a
foot race among patent counsel is indeed a lamentable spectacle. I believe that a litigant, whether a swift first or as a prompt
retaliator, is open to the charge of forum shopping whenever
he chooses a forum with a slight connection to the factual circumstances surrounding his suit. Litigants should be encouraged to attempt to settle their differences without imposing
53
undue expense and vexatious situations on the courts.

patent should turn out to be invalid smacks too much of the hypothetical and
contingent and allowing the declaratory remedy in such a situation would unfairly subject the defendant to the burdens of a lawsuit.
315 F.2d at 90 (citation omitted). See generally Russell, Some Patent Aspects of Declaratory
Procedure, 32 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 504 (1950); Note, Justiciable Controversy Under the Federal
DeclaratoryJudgment Act and the Exercise of PatentRights, 22 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 63 (1953).
50 Japan Gas Lighter Ass'n v. Ronson Corp., 257 F. Supp. 219, 237 (D.N.J. 1966).
"Reasonable apprehension," however, does not appear to be broad enough to include one
who has not yet infringed. See note 71 and accompanying text infra.
51 O'Rourke, supra note 36, at 544:
One of the reasons for this situation is the liberality that accompanies the interpretation of the Declaratory Judgment Act. Courts are weakening useful
criteria which balance the rights of patentees and infringers and, unfortunately,
the patentee is suffering from this condition.
52 Id.
53 Rayco Mfg. Co. v. Chicopee Mfg. Corp., 148 F. Supp. 588, 592-93 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
For other patent cases deploring forum shopping maneuvers, see Skil Corp. v. Millers Falls
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Counsel for the plaintiff in Helene Curtis Industries v. Sales
Affiliates 54 appears to hold a record in the Patent Office to courthouse dash. The patent involved issued at noon on December 4,
1951. A complaint for declaratory judgment was filed in the
Southern District of New York just fifty-nine minutes later. This
race to choose the forum thrives on the differences in the law as
applied by the different circuits. Moreover, the problem it poses is
sadly compounded by the finality that results from the rule in
55

Blonder-Tongue.

Co., 541 F.2d 554 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1029 (1976); William Gluckin & Co.
v. International Playtex Corp., 407 F.2d 177 (2d Cir. 1969); Codex Corp. v. Milgo Elec.
Corp., 533 F.2d 735 (lst Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 860 (1977).
" 105 F. Supp. 886, 891 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, 199 F.2d 732 (2d Cir. 1952).
55 In Codex Corp. v. Milgo Elec. Corp., 553 F.2d 735 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
860 (1977), a manufacturer allegedly infringing a patented device brought a declaratory
judgment action in Massachusetts and sought an injunction against an earlier action that
the patentee had brought in Kansas. According to Horn & Epstein, the First Circuit was
fairly "anti-" patent, and the Tenth Circuit was the most "pro-" patent circuit in the ten
year period they studied. See Horn & Epstein, supra note 23, at 146. The patent holder in
Codex could not sue the manufacturer in Kansas; venue would have been improper. Instead, he sued a distributor located there, knowing the manufacturer would be forced to
come and defend. The district judge in Codex denied the injunction. The Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit reversed and enjoined the Kansas action, noting the deplorable battle
to choose the forum:
Milgo [the patentee] argues that the Kansas action, having been filed earlier, should be preferred .... While the first-filed rule may ordinarily be a
prudent one, it is so only because it is sometimes more important that there be
a rule than that the rule be particularly sound. Accordingly, an exception to the
first-filed rule has developed in patent litigation where an earlier action is air
infringement suit against a mere customer and the later suit is a declaratory
judgment action brought by the manufacturer of the accused devices... At the
root of the preference for a manufacturer's declaratory judgment action is the
recognition that, in reality, the manufacturer is the true defendant in the customer suit. In spite of Milgo's vigorous protests to the contrary, it is a simple
fact of life that a manufacturer must protect its customers, either as a matter of
contract, or good business, or in order to avoid the damaging, impact of an
adverse ruling against its products.
Venue rights, contrary, perhaps, to the view of the district court, which did
not mention them at all, are important, particularly in patent litigation ...
where it is well known that the patent bar believes that the hospitality accorded
patents varies markedly from circuit to circuit. With the advent of BlonderTongue Laboratories,Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, ... establishing, as to
patentees, the one-strike-and-you're-out doctrine, forum shopping becomes
peculiarly appealing. In these circumstances, while we do not say that there
should be an inflexible rule, we would recognize a rebuttable presumption that
a manufacturer's declaratory judgment action, in its home forum, at least if
brought no later than promptly after a customer action, should take precedence

19791

PATENT OFFICE REFORM

95

E. The Expense of Patent Litigation
Patent litigation is extraordinarily costly, for a number of
reasons. Patent cases tend to take a great deal of time to present
and prepare because they involve so much technical information. 5 6 District judges generally lack the necessary technical
background, and a great deal of time is spent educating the judge
in the particular field involved. The litigants must hire experts to
testify concerning the state of the art at the time of invention and
help with the preparation for trial. Finally, the cost of discovery in
such actions is often staggering. The cost of each suit to enforce a
patent detracts from the value of the patent. An individual inventor confronted with this cost 57 may wonder just how much justice

he can afford.
The cost of patent litigation is a weapon in the hands of a
defendant. The patent law presently allows an infringer to raise
so many issues 5 8 that he can frequently make trial expensive
enough to force a patentee entitled to royalties to give up.5 9 This
is particularly true in light of Blonder-Tongue. A patentee may not
be able to afford to put on too costly a presentation, but he also
cannot afford to put on a less-than-best defense of his patent because one loss will be fatal.

over a mere customer action in a jurisdiction in which the manufacturer could
not be sued.
553 F.2d at 737-38 (footnotes omitted). See also Note, The "ManufacturerForum Only" Rule
In Patent Validity Litigation, 53 NOTRE DAME LAW. 941 (1978).
"o See, e.g., Blonder-Tongue Laboratories v. University of Ill. Foundation, 402 U.S. 313
(1971). The Court quoted a survey revealing that although over 90% of all civil cases are
tried in three days or less, less than 50% of patent cases are completed in that time. Id. at
537 n.31. According to a recent note "[1litigation costs now exceed $100,000 in a typical
infringement action where a patent's validity is contested." See Note, supra note 12, 1978
Wis. L. REv. at 1172 n.66.
57 Particularly in view of the possibility of a prompt declaratory judgment action (see
notes 49-55 and accompanying text supra) the patent owner may not have realized any
royalties at the time of suit and may not have the resources to defend his patent.
51 See notes 81-92 and accompanying text infra.
59 Based on personal experience, cases where controversies arise and are settled
before the case is submitted to the Courts constitute the large majority. Some
sort of settlement is reached [after) the patentee decides to abandon a contemplated action realizing that the risk is too great and outbalances the expenses of litigation.
Jacobacci, Patent Enforcement in Italy, 57 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 569 (1975). This refers to
patent litigation in Italy, but the systems are similar in this regard, and the comment implies broader application.
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F. The Equitable Defense of Laches in Patent Litigation
As if the patentee's outlook were not already sufficiently
bleak, he must also contend with the doctrine of laches.6 0 Laches,
in the patent area, is the requirement that a patent holder not
knowingly allow infringement to continue so long that others
might believe he has acquiesced in the loss of his rights. 6' This
rule is reasonable under the present system as a patent on record
in the Patent Office may be invalid and thus not worth enforcing.
It is often reasonable for a business to make the investments
necessary to produce a patented item if it appears that the paten62
tee does not intend to enforce his patent.
G. Cumulative Effects
These six factors combined present the inventor whose patent
has been infringed with a dilemma. He may not have the financial
resources to marshal a strong defense of his patent, but he cannot
afford to risk a less vigorous defense because one adverse decision
may invalidate his patent. Moreover, he cannot risk laches or a
declaratory judgment suit in an unsympathetic forum by deciding
not to sue. Whatever he does is unsatisfactory. This dilemma robs
patents of most of their value, to the detriment of the public as
well as the patentees.
Dividing patents into three rough categories-specious, probable, and absolute-helps to illustrate this point. 63 A "specious"
patent is only useful to scare potential competitors; the patentee
knows his patent is unlikely to survive litigation. A "probable"
patent is one that is sought in good faith, but subject to a risk of

60 See note 92 infra; Choate, supra note 5, at 854. See also Gillons v. Shell Co., 86
F.2d 600 (9th Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 689 (1937).
61 See Whitman v. Walt Disney Prods., Inc., 148 F. Supp. 37 (S.D. Cal. 1957), aff'd, 263
F.2d 229 (9th Cir. 1958). The Whitman court commented that "[bly weight of authority,
lack of funds is no excuse for delay in bringing suit." 148 F. Supp. at 40.
62 See, e.g., Westco-Chippewa Pump Co., v. Delaware Elec. & Supply Co., 64 F.2d 185
(3d Cir. 1933).
[A] uniform principle runs through all the cases. They proceed on the
theory that the plaintiff knows his rights and has had ample opportunity to
establish them in the proper forum; that, because of delay, the defendant has
good reason to think that the plaintiff believes his asserted rights to be worthless or that he has abandoned them.
Id. at 187.
63 Compare Judge Friendly's analysis in Painton & Co. v. Bourns, Inc., 442 F.2d 216
(2d Cir. 1971), discussed in note 8 supra.
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invalidity. An "absolute" patent is sought to protect a discovery so
significant that it is almost certain to survive litigation.
A specious patent's value is virtually unaffected by the dilemma. Its holder has no intention of going to trial. He need not
worry about Blonder-Tongue, litigation costs, declaratory judgments, forum shopping, or laches. The infirmities of a patent system only diminsh the value of his patent as a scarecrow to the
extent that they undermine respect for patents generally. A specious patent will continue to be useful for bluffing and threatening those who do not have the benefit of a patent counsel's
advice or the resources to face even a sham lawsuit.
At the other extreme, the holder of an absolute patent is also
only marginally affected by the dilemma. His patent is not likely
to be challenged, and if challenged, will almost certainly survive.
He may, however, feel pressure to settle claims because a fluke
decision could invalidate his patent. Under Blonder-Tongue he
might then lose it even if it had been upheld before. To avoid this
he may have to spend more money to defend his patent than is at
issue in a particular case. 4 His failure to sue, even under these
circumstances, may constitute laches. Thus, even absolute patents
may be settled for significantly less than their value in certain
situations.
The same problems destroy the value of a probable patent
almost entirely. Where an invention is novel but cursed by some
related prior art, litigation is extremely uncertain. Nonobviousness
is highly subjective and judges often appear to slip into a certain
amount of hindsight when they consider a patent.6 5 The patentee faces risk, confusion, and expense at every turn. He stands to
gain little from a patent beyond its settlement value. In this respect the law presently treats him much like the holder of a spe-

64 Quoting Blonder-Tongue, the Third Circuit in Kaiser Indus. Corp. v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 515 F.2d 964, 977 (3d Cir. 1975) suggested that in patent litigation,
the parties are always expected to litigate the case fully.
Additionally, mindful of the deliberate nature of patent litigation and the high
stakes that can turn on a question of patent validity, the Supreme Court in
Blonder-Tongue cautioned: Presumably [the patentee] was prepared to litigate
and to litigate to the finish against the defendant there involved .. "
Thus, for patent purposes, the Court assumed away the usual mitigating exception to
the Blonder-Tongue rule-that the stakes must be high enough in the original suit to insure
that the issues were fully contested.
11 See note 20 supra.
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cious patent. For both, the principal value of their patent may
well be as a bluffing and threatening tool.
Each troublesome aspect of the present system for contesting
patents can be defended. The inconsistencies of the circuits provide the Supreme Court with a range of developed alternatives to
consider. Blonder-Tongue will remove a great deal of frivolous or
repetitive litigation. The Declaratory Judgment Act provides a
remedy that probably should be further expanded to avoid unnecessary hardship. The doctrine of laches protects one who has
reasonably, and at great expense, relied on a patent holder's inactivity over a substantial period of time from a surprise suit on a
patent that appeared to be abandoned. Changes in one or more
of these procedural areas will not restore the patent system to
healthy operation. Rather, the plight of the patentee should spur
consideration of new alternatives.
II
THE PROPOSAL

A. The Mechanics of the Proposal
Under the proposed system, the Patent Office would consider
the inventors' applications ex parte and accord the patents that it
issues a presumption of validity. 66 Anyone who wants to produce
an item protected by a patent that may be invalid wouldfirst have
to prosecute an "opposition" to the patent before the Patent Office. To promote the use of this opposition procedure, an infringer would be required to file an opposition promptly after he
becomes aware of the patent and of the art that tends to defeat it.
A duty to investigate diligently would also be imposed so that
an infringer could not escape liability simply by remaining ignorant of the patent. The courts will have to develop the boundaries
of this duty on a case-by-case basis, with the realities of the business world in mind. It is clear, however, that once the patentee
actually notifies the infringer of the patent, he has a duty to oppose. The facts in certain cases may dictate a duty to oppose that
begins at an earlier time. For example, if the patent is well known,
or if the item is well known and prominently displays its patent,

66 The presumption of validity is provided for in 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1976). It is now
supposed to be applied by the courts. But see note 5 supra.
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such a duty should arise. To enforce this duty and to ensure
prompt oppositions, an infringer who did not make a reasonable
effort to discover a patent's existence, or who knew of it but did
not file an opposition immediately, would be liable for interim
royalties from the time he began to infringe until he filed. 67 This
liability would accrue whether or not his opposition was ultimately
successful.
The opposition process must be as informal as possible to
avoid deterring oppositions. The Patent Office examiner should
consider any submission of material, and he should have an af68
firmative duty to ensure that the opposition is fully considered.
Anyone could file an opposition, without regard to the
judicial doctrine of standing. 69 Completely disinterested persons
might have some information to offer, and there is no reason that
the Patent Office should not consider it. The patent holder is not
in danger of harassment because he is not involved in this early
proceeding.7 0 Moreover, many persons have valid reasons for
wishing to challenge a patent but can not bring a declaratory
judgment action under the current interpretation of the "case or
7
controversy" requirement. '
An opposition could be made at any time during the life of
the patent, and the same person may file any number of oppositions. 72 The Patent Office would have a specified amount of time

67

After the date of filing, any delay may be attributable to the Patent Office or the

courts (on appeal), and therefore should not be charged to the opposer. Some abuse of the
system may creep in at this point, but no other solution seems feasible. Any infringer who
has not challenged the patent should be charged with royalties until the patent is finally
adjudged invalid.
This interim royalty provision mirrors the present concept of laches (see notes 60-62
and accompanying text supra) which presently penalizes a patent holder who fails to enforce his patent diligently. The reasoning behind the doctrine of laches is that the patentee
will have induced investment or other acts of reliance by his inaction. Under a system that
provides an opposition procedure an infringer ought to be similarly punished; his tardiness
may cause patentees and licensees to take costly action in reliance on an apparently valid
patent.
6 The Patent Office should be provided with subpoena and discovery powers for these
purposes.
69 Licensees would, of course, be entitled to submit material in opposition as a matter
of public policy. See Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969).
70 See note 76 and accompanying text infra.
71 Compare Sticker Indus. Supply Corp. v. Blaw-Knox Co., 367 F.2d 744 (7th Cir. 1966)
with American Needle & Novelty Co. v. Schuessler Knitting Mills, Inc., 379 F.2d 376 (7th
Cir. 1967). See notes 41-51 and accompanying text supra.
72 Nor should he be required to cite new material; he might wish to argue that patent
law has changed, by statute or decision, since he last filed an opposition.
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after filing in which to act on the opposition. If the Office rejects
an opposition and upholds the patent, the opposer would have a
3
right of appeal to the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals,1
and from there, by discretionary appeal, to the Supreme
Court.7 4 If the Patent Office failed to act on the opposition during the allotted time, the opposer could choose either to keep his
petition active in the Patent Office or to consider it rejected by
75
default and pursue his appeals.
At the time of filing the patentee would receive nothing more
than a notice of the pending opposition with a copy of the papers
filed in support of it. He could choose to rebut immediately, but
76
the proposal contemplates that he would not ordinarily do so.
If, however, the Patent Office accepted the opposition and declared the patent "tentatively invalid," the patent holder would
have a brief time to counter the opposition within the Patent Office. 77 If he counters, but is unsuccessful, he would then have a
78
limited time for judicial appeals.
In countering an opposition or pursuing an appeal, a patentee whose patent is still tentatively invalid would have the option
to restrict his claims and obtain a more limited reissue of his pat-

7' This removes most patent litigation from the United States District Courts and
Courts of Appeals (see notes 81-95 and accompanying text infra) which would prevent
forum shopping and the use of inordinate delays to pressure certain litigants for unjustified settlements. See notes 22-28, 52-55 and accompanying text supra.
Some cause for concern may arise from the fact that the C.C.P.A. is considered one of
the "pro"-patent courts. See notes 22-28 and accompanying text supra. This concern should
dissipate if the proposed reform is enacted. The C.C.P.A. would become the central forum
for patent review, and the Supreme Court would therefore subject it to somewhat greater
scrutiny. A similar role change would probably affect the quality of the Patent Office's
procedures. See notes 117-121 and accompanying text infra.
" This is available now in actions before the C.C.P.A. See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S.
519 (1966); 28 U.S.C. § 1256 (1976).
" The courts should not give a rejection by default any of the deference they might
accord an actual Patent Office determination. The two options are provided since the opposer may or may not have the motivation and resources to pursue the appeal. Those who
do not would prefer to remain at the Patent Office stage where the examiner has an
affirmative duty to pursue the opposition for them.
76 In fact, any such response would be by way of friendly suggestion to the Patent
Office. The patentee, because of the intervening steps discussed below, is not threatened
with any adverse action at this point and, accordingly, would not be a party to such proceedings.
77 Since the patentee is aware of the opposition, a short period is reasonable; he is on
notice to prepare if he feels the opposition is likely to be successful.
7' This appeal would also be to the C.C.P.A. and possibly from there to the Supreme
Court.
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ent for the remaining portion of its term. On either the patentee's
failure to counter the opposition or to take an appeal, or on a
final adverse decision, the tentative invalidity would become per79
manent and the patent could not be reinstated.
The time allotted the Patent Office for responding to an opposition, and the patentee for taking his appeals, must be as short
as is fair and practical. During this period of delay manufacturers
must operate in uncertainty. If the patent is upheld, they will be
liable for infringing it while the opposition is pending even if they
have filed promptly. This will deter manufacturers from producing the patented item, imposing an unnecessary cost on society.
Under the proposal patent infringement litigation would remain in the federal district courts.8" The issues that litigants
could contest there, however, would be sharply limited. At present, an alleged infringer may raise the following issues in his
defense: (1) noninfringement, absence of liability for infringement, or unenforceability;81 (2) nonpatentability of the subject
matter; 82 (3) lack of novelty in the claimed invention; 83 (4) delay
in filing the patent application 84 (statutory bar); (5) abandonment; 85 (6) improper foreign filing; 86 (7) that the patentee is not
the "inventor at law";

87

(8) lack of utility;

88

(9) obviousness;

89

(10)

insufficiency of the patent specifications; 90 (11) breach of responsibility to the Patent Office; 91 and (12) laches. 2 Of these issues,
those which go to the "scientific" appropriateness of the issuance

7' The system would otherwise have to provide for the legitimate concerns of those
who begin manufacturing, selling, or using the product in reliance on the final judgment
of invalidity.
80 The federal courts have jurisdiction in patent cases by virtue of 28 U.S.C. § 1338
(1976).
81 35 U.S.C. § 282(1) (1976). See also Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17-18
(1966).
82 35 U.S.C. §§ 282(2), 101 (1976).
83 Id. §§ 282(2), 102(a).
84 Id. §§ 282(2), 102(b).
85 Id. §§ 282(2), 102(c).
86 Id. §§ 282(2), 102(d).
87 Id. §§ 282(2), 102(e), (f), (g).
8 Id. §§ 282(2), 101.
89 Id. §§ 282(2), 103.
90 Id. §§ 282(2), 112.
9' See Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Mach. Co., 324 U.S.
806 (1945).
02 See Baker Mfg. Co. v. Whitewater Mfg. Co., 430 F.2d 1008 (7th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 956 (1971).

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65:75

of a patent for a given "invention"-patentability of subject matter, novelty, inventorship at law, 93 obviousness, abandonment, utility, and sufficiency of patent specifications-would no longer be
litigated before a court of general jurisdiction.9 4
Such issues require special technical expertise and are pertinent to whether the Patent Office should issue or continue a patent. Their resolution involves a full analysis of the inventive
essence of the new process, art, machine, method, use,
manufacture, material, or composition of matter at stake. The issues reserved for the courts, on the other hand, are more like
traditional issues of fact and applied law that lie within the competence of the courts. Adjudicating the occurrence of infringement is similar to finding whether a duty has been breached in a
tort case; 95 laches, unenforceability, and fraud sound in contract;
and delay in filing or improper foreign filing resemble civil and
criminal procedural problems. Thus, the proposal effects a sensible division of responsibility.
B. The Effects of the Proposal
By centralizing all patent validity proceedings into the Patent
Office with appeal to the C.C.P.A., the proposal seeks to create as
uniform a law of patents as possible. Centralization would bypass

9' Inventorship at law appears, at first glance, to be a traditional issue of fact.
Nevertheless, the concept involves so much analysis of what acts would constitute sufficient
reduction to practice, etc., that it is largely technical.
"4 One might even consider eliminating the role of the district courts altogether. This
proposal does not restrict patent litigation to the Patent Office for several reasons. In some
instances there may be jury-triable issues such as damages (see, e.g., Railex Corp. v. Joseph
Guss & Sons, Inc., 40 F.R.D. 119, 123 (D.D.C. 1966)) which some might prefer to preserve.
See Note, Application of Constitutional Guarantees of Jury Trial to the Administrative Process, 56
HARv. L. REv. 282 (1942). Also, counterclaims may complicate an infringement action. See,
e.g., Eli Lilly & Co. v. Generix Drug Sales, Inc., 460 F.2d 1096 (5th Cir. 1972). Moreover, it
is best to proceed with novel ideas step by step. If the Patent Office can inspire public
confidence in its operations, under the authority proposed here, perhaps that authority
should be extended. This Article suggests that the Patent Office's role under the present
proposal would tend to increase public confidence in the patent system greatly. See notes
117-121 and accompanying text infra. Thus, further expansion of the Office's role may be
warranted in the future.
" Nevertheless, the issue of infringement is a borderline case. It requires understanding of the essence of the inventive idea to decide how similar a product can be to a
patented invention without infringement. The courts have handled this issue well to date.
Either the courts or the Patent Office would be an acceptable forum for its resolution.
Infringement has not generated the controversy and inequity that have grown out of the
judicial experience with patent validity.
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inconsistency among the circuits. It would also reduce inconsistency that grows out of ambiguity in the standards courts apply,
because the Patent Office and the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals would acquire a fluency in making subtle factual distinctions that the district courts lack. 96 The proposed system would
not only create uniformity in adjudication, but also between adjudication and administration because the Patent Office would interact directly and routinely with the C.C.P.A. In this sense, the
proposal does little more than bring patent law into step with
modern administrative law. 97
In Blonder-Tongue the Supreme Court attempted to deal with
the desperate need for finality, uniformity, and judicial economy
in the administration of the patent law. 9 8 By eliminating the
mutuality requirement for estoppel the Court, in effect, created a
judicial post-issuance opposition procedure 9 9 which could strike
down patents permanently. This solution was far from ideal. The
finality it created was subject to limitations.' 0 0 The uniformity it
produced by ensuring that different circuits would no longer
reach different conclusions as to the same patent after one found
it invalid was superficial. The circuits have gone on applying different de facto legal standards. The litigant who sues first,
thereby gaining the choice of forums still determines which law is
applicable. Further, as the courts do not at present directly review
the Patent Office, dead patents can hang indefinitely in Patent
Office lists as scarecrows"' to frighten away potential inventors.
The proposed system serves the same purposes as Blonder-Tongue
without any of these drawbacks.
The concerns that prompted the Declaratory Judgments Act
are even better served by the proposal. The availability of declaratory relief under the present system remains uncertain because of the lingering "cases and controversies" requirement.
Some courts still interpret this more strictly than others,'0 2 and
See note 21 supra.
See notes 2-5 and accompanying text supra.
98 See note 31 and accompanying text supra.
9' The "opposer" can invoke the process through the use of declaratory judgments,
and collateral estoppel will virtually always apply in patent actions. See notes 34, 64 and
accompanying text supra.
100 A court might find that a litigant had not a full and fair opportunity to litigate the
prior action. See Currie, supra note 33. But see note 64 supra.
101 See Bresnick v. United States Vitamin Corp., 139 F.2d 239, 242 (2d Cir. 1943).
102 See American Needle & Novelty Co. v. Schuessler Knitting Mills, 379 F.2d 376 (7th
96

7

Cir. 1967) (patentee's request to examine possibly infringing article held not sufficient to
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deny would-be competitors a timely declaration of their rights.
Consider the plight of the person who wishes to begin manufacturing widgets, which are protected by a dubious patent. He
needs to borrow five million dollars for a widget factory but he
cannot until the banks know whether the patent is valid.
Nevertheless, he probably lacks standing to bring a declaratory
judgment action. He has not yet manufactured widgets nor has he
been threatened with infringement proceedings. 10 3
The proposed Patent Office opposition procedure, on the
other hand, guarantees a convenient and timely determination of
the question of patent validity. The procedure could be invoked
by any person, even one who does not anticipate infringing the
patent but has some information to offer. No one would have to
gamble a heavy investment on the chance that a court will hold a
patent invalid; the proposal wastes neither judicial nor economic
resources.
The high cost of patent litigation may seem irremediable. The
proposed system, however, might reduce costs, both to the litigants and to the judicial system. Institution of the opposition procedure would reduce judicial costs because it will greatly reduce
litigation in the federal district courts. The range of issues that
litigants could raise in conjunction with each trial would shrink,
and certainty as to patent validity would result in greater rates of
settlement.'

0 4

Some may argue the proposal would merely transfer the litigation saved in the district courts to the Patent Office and the
C.C.P.A., at the same net expense. This argument ignores the redundant patent validity litigation which goes on despite BlonderTongue because successive infringers can still raise the issue as a
defense. It also fails to consider the advantages of administrative
flexibilty. Patent Office procedures would probably be less timeconsuming and expensive than those of the courts. Finally, the
argument fails to consider the effect of the expertise that the Patent Office and the C.C.P.A. would gain. This should drastically
reduce the need for detailed oral proofs and explanations, as well
as improving the quality of the decisionmaking process. Issues

create reasonable apprehension of suit). This case is a textbook example of how to threaten
an infringer without threatening him enough to allow a declaratory judgment action.
103 See notes 41-49 and accompanying text supra.
104 See Ehrlich & Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257,
265 (1974).
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that now require a complex trial involving several days of testimony might be resolved by the submission of documents and
possibly a brief supplemental argument.
The eminent jurist David Bazelon recently commented on the
extent to which federal judges are unequipped to hear cases that
turn on scientific issues: "I suggested.., that judges are, for the
most part, 'technically illiterate,' and I certainly include myself in
that category."' 10 5 He also pointed out that a judgeship in the
federal courts is not the place "for on-the-job training." 106 Patent
practice is, along with admiralty, one of only two specialties that
the bar recognizes.10 7 How does a lawyer who is incapable of
trying patent cases become competent to decide them when Congress makes him a judge? One well respected district judge has
seriously pondered the propriety of his role in deciding patent
cases:
I am otherwise an experienced trial judge equipped to
handle any type of case which might arise, having presided
over thousands of trials during my fourteen years as a trial
judge in the state courts and my twelve years as a federal district court judge-in addition to almost 25 years experience as
an active trial lawyer. Why then do I fear patent cases and
things that go "bump, in the night?"108
The proposed system would also reduce the cost to litigants,
for the same reasons. Court time is time the litigants must also
,05Bazelon, Coping With Technology Through the Legal Process, 62 CORNELL L. REv. 817,

817 (1977) (footnote omitted).
106 Id.
107

at 822.
See R. CHOATE, supra note 5, at 602. The specialized judges of the G.C.P.A. would

not only expedite suits with their technical expertise, but they would also bring perspective
to their judgments based on experience. This is especially important in the patent field
because cases often turn on the characterization of facts, rather than on legal analysis.
108 Marovitz, Patent Cases in the District Courts-Who Should Hear Them?, 58 J. PAT. OFF.
SOC'Y 760, 761 (1976). Judge Marovitz sits on the busy United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois. He continues:
[w]hen I drew an antitrust case, a multi-defendant criminal case, or an
involved securities case, I was unperturbed. Nevertheless, when I drew a patent
case, to be perfectly honest, I was less than overjoyed. I envisioned inordinate
amounts of trial time, mountains of documents, reams of testimony, countless
mysterious diagrams, and endless verbal duels between experts who speak in a
foreign tongue and write in an alien language. I was overcome by a feeling that
I was being compelled to perform in a role for which I was dreadfully ill pre-

pared, and to witness the judicial system operating at its poorest. I might venture to guess that these feelings are not unusual among patent-inexperienced
judges in the federal judiciary.
Id. at 761-62.
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invest, and preparation time is directly related to court time.
Moreover, discovery costs would probably be more modest in patent office proceedings. Litigants often use discovery as a weapon
to force unjust settlements. This would not be possible in the
proposed administrative proceedings, as those proceedings would
be brought long before any litigation of royalties. This would
deter costly frivolous discovery. Also, the usual battle of the experts would be avoided by tapping Patent Office expertise.
The proposal would enhance the value of valid patents and
destroy the utility of specious ones. It truly presumes that a patent
is valid, A patentee need not defend his patent until an opposer
convinces the Patent Office that there is good reason to question
it."°9 Under the present system an infringer can force a patentee
to settle for less than the value of his claim by raising patent invalidity as a defense and threatening an expensive trial. The
proposal would block such threats by requiring prompt opposition
and enforcing the requirement with a provision for assessing interim royalties against dilatory infringers. 11° This change is particularly significant to the individual inventor whose resources
may be limited.i" The same provision would deter specious patent applications. Under the proposed system a weak patent would
probably not go unopposed long enough to be a useful bluffing
tool.
Finally, the proposed reorganization would allow Congress
and the public to scrutinize the patent system more effectively.
This may be its most important effect. Patent Office records
catalogue patents without regard to whether the courts have been
willing to award damages for their infringement. There is simply
no way to tell what percentage of the issued patents are valid.
Under the proposal the Office would void patents that failed to
survive an opposition. Moreover, the C.C.P.A. would reverse it to
109

See note 76 and accompanying text supra.

110 See note 67 and accompanying text supa.

"I For example, the patent law system rewards the first inventor to conceive of an idea
provided he exercises "due diligence" in reducing the idea to practice and filing an application for a patent. Mason v. Hepburn, 13 App. D.C. 86 (1898); 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (1976). A
first-to-file system would reward an institutional inventor who could complete an idea and
bring it to the Patent Office before an individual inventor with limited resources who had
invented it first. See generally R. CHOATE, supra note 5, at 142-51; Moffit, Is a First-To-File
Patent System Constitutional?, 50 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 754 (1968). Canada and the Philippines
appear to have the only other patent systems with the first-to-conceive rule. See R. CHOATE,
supra note 5, at 150. This unusual burden is tolerated in our system because of a commitment to the small inventor. The same concern should dictate that the patent system provide him with a remedy regardless of his ability to pay for patent litigation.
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void the patent at issue. Thus, Patent Office files would reflect the
actual status of patents, which would make the system more susceptible to political supervision. Centralization of patent adjudication would also promote scrutiny. The public cannot focus on the
law in its current fragmented state. Reorganization would encourage Congress and the public to participate in defining the policy
of the patent system.
C. Objections to the Proposal
The discussion of this proposal for changing present patent
law practice would be incomplete without consideration of some
of the foremost concerns such a proposal might raise. This Article
will examine three of these: (1) concern that there will be excessive delays during decisionmaking and appeals; (2) concern that
the additional responsibility will overload the Patent Office; and
(3) concern that the Patent Office will look too favorably on patent applications.
1. Delay
The proposal is less likely to cause delays than the present
system, for a number of reasons. First, it limits the time that the
Patent Office has to act on an opposition, and the time the patentee has to come to the defense of his patent once it is declared
tentatively invalid. Second, the Patent Office can give its full attention to patent litigation. The district courts must find time for
patent suits in between other more pressing cases."' Third, the
interim royalty provision forces prompt action by infringers. Finally, if delays did occur, opposers would have the option of seeking judicial determination in the C.C.P.A. after a short statutory
period. 13
The possibility that the proposed system could result in delays
does not render it unserviceable. The present system causes greater
delays without generating any certainty as to patent validity. The
delays and costs of full civil trials and appeals are the yardstick by
which the proposal must be measured.
2. Overloading the Patent Office
The Patent Office has significantly decreased its backlog of

112 For example, the disrict courts must deal with criminal cases first.
113

See note 75 and accompanying text supra.
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cases over the last several years.' 1 4 Moreover, the Patent Office
could consider an opposition with a minimum expenditure of
man-hours by assigning an examiner to it who is already familiar
with the kind of issues it presents. Some additions to the existing
staff of the Patent Office would be necessary, but this cost should
be small compared to the funds saved by the decrease in the judicial caseload. Finally, by deterring the filing of specious patent
applications, the proposed procedure may save the Patent Office
untold man-hours.
3. Patent Office Leniency
A great debate rages in patent circles over whether the Patent
Office is too lenient or the courts are too strict in deciding on the
patentability of inventions. Since patent law is the product of isolated and scattered decisions of a variety of courts applying differing standards, it is difficult to say with any certainty where the law
stands." 1 5 In any event, the debate seems to assume that either
the Patent Office is too lenient or the courts are too strict. In fact,
both are probably true. As Mr. Justice Jackson stated, dissenting
in Jungerson v. Ostby & Barton Co.: ""
I doubt that the remedy for such Patent Office passion for
granting patents is an equally strong passion in this Court for
striking them down so that the only patent that is valid is one
17
which this Court has not been able to get it hands on.'
It can hardly be denied that the Patent Office allows many
doubtful patents. This is so, however, because of the peculiar
role that the Patent Office presently plays. The Patent Office
does not actually decide the validity of patents; it merely initiates them into the system, acting only as a filter. A recent article
by former Commissioner of Patents Brenner displays the attitude
that it is not for the Patent Office to settle the validity of patents
114 Compare Brenner, Patent Law Revision-How Much Do We Really Need?, 58 J.
PAT. OFF. Soc'y 306 (1976) with Graham v. John Deere Co., 389 U.S. 1, 18 (1966). In
Graham the Supreme Court sympathized with the Patent Office's caseload-100,000 applications a year and a backlog of over 200,000 applications in 1965. Unfortunately, the Office's backlog has begun to swell again, largely due to budget cutbacks. "About 10,000
examined applications are awaiting action; a year ago the backlog was close to 1,000." N.Y.
Times, Oct. 6, 1979, at 38, col. 1.
115 In any event, less than one percent of all patents are ever litigated. Abramson, Should
the U.S. Adopt A Re-examination System, 52 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 406, 409-10 (1970).
116 335 U.S. 560 (1949).
117 Id. at 572. Compare Fortas, supra note 38, with Note, supra note 12, 1978 Wis. L. REv.
1155.

1979]

PATENT OFFICE REFORM

in what he calls "the grey area"-the unclear cases. Since the system at .present leaves the issue to the courts, the Patent Office
may feel that any patent that might be upheld should be "given a
chance." Otherwise it would be depriving the courts of an opportunity to set forth the law on such cases. Since the courts have the
added input of an adversary, the true test of patent validity is to
be conducted there. 11 Also, since the courts do not appear to
take a consistent line, it may well be impossible for the Patent
Office to 'follow' judicial decisions on patents. Under the proposed system, none of these considerations would restrain the
Patent Office. Moreover, the Patent Office would have to face
constant reversals if it were to maintain too lenient a position."19
The proposal would also remove another impetus for careless
Patent Office action:
The Patent Office system encourages the granting of patents even under circumstances where the expert Examiner does
not believe invention exists. The Patent Examiner is and for
many years has been rated based upon "dispositions," i.e., cases
of which he has disposed; generally this yardstick of his performance does not take into consideration factors such as the
118 See Brenner, Patent Law Revision-How Much Do We Really Need?, 58 J. PAT. OFF. SocY
306 (1976). This suggestion is from the tone throughout the article. One illustrative example from which the reader may find such an attitude is as follows:
The charge that there is a major problem with the patent system because
approximately half of the litigated patents are held invalid is misleading, it is
submitted, since it really is no more a problem than exists in any other field of
law. More particularly, our country is always going to have litigation in contested cases and some of these cases will be won by 'the plaintiffs and some will
be won by the defendants. Further, patent quality is not "perfect" and never
will be, at least as long as human beings are involved in the process of filing,
prosecuting, searching, examining and adjudicating patents. Judgments of
reasonable people can and do differ. Also, usually only the doubtful or "grey
area" patents reach trial and adjudication.

Further, there are those who would erroneously try to extrapolate the patent litigation statistics in an attempt to contend that half of the patents issued
by the U.S. Patent Office may be invalid. This is clearly in error and is somewhat akin to the illogical conclusion that because, say 50% of criminal defendants are found guilty, therefore 50% of the citizens of our country are criminals.
Id. at 311-12. Such calm acceptance of judicial invalidation indicates a low expectation of
finality. By way of contrast, a district judge who is overruled in 50% of his appealed cases
would be far more concerned.
11' The proposal would also make the C.C.P.A. less likely to look too favorably upon
patents. A central intermediate appellate court would be the Supreme Court's sole focus
when it turned its attention to patent law. The author is not aware that any writer has ever
accused the Supreme Court of looking too favorably upon patents.
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time which the Examiner has spent, nor the correctness of his
decisions in a given case. Thus in face of an obviously persistent, albeit "wrong" applicant seeking a patent, a Patent
Examiner is in effect, encouraged to allow a patent, rather than
to finally reject it. The allowance results in a "disposition"; any
other course of action results in an appeal-not a disposition.
In the case of an appeal, the Examiner, in response to the
applicant's brief, is required to file an Examiner's Answeroften a time-consuming task-and since it is a non"disposition," in his view, a thankless task. Is it any wonder that
many Examiners adopt the attitude of "not bucking the system"; if "invention" or lack of it is a matter of some judgment (and surely all would agree that it is), then why not in a
close case, (or one somewhat close) give the applicant the
benefit of the doubt, get a disposition by allowance and go on
to the next case, thus increasing the Examiner's production on
performance.

120

Under the proposed system, on the other hand, the examiner's
allowance of a patent could be reversed, and he would then be
called to defend in a later opposition appeal. Thus, the path of
least resistance would no longer be safe.' 2 '
CONCLUSION

The costs that the present patent system imposes are prohibitive. Its fragmented, inconsistent adjudication promotes forum
shopping, which adds to the regrettable image of American justice
as a procedural plaything of lawyers who have forgotten the essence of the game. It also commits the decision of complex technical patent cases to inexpert judges.
The benefits of this proposal consist largely of curing these

Horn & Epstein, supra note 23, at 139-40.
In response to this problem, Horn and Epstein suggest the possibility of a postissuance opposition procedure but fail to elaborate.
Consideration should be given to the President's Patent Reform Commission in
1968 recommendations, that oppositions be permitted to would-be patents
somewhat similar to the Dutch and German systems. It is not suggested that
either of those systems should in toto be adopted by the U.S., but serious
thought ought to be given to having some sort of input by the industry prior to
issue. Such a procedure has long been in effect under the trademark laws in
the United States and successfully administered by the Patent Office where
there is not only an opposition proceeding procedure before issue, but a proceeding possibility available to cancel the trademark after issue.
Id. at 142.
120
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failings. It provides for centralized decisionmaking in an expert
forum. By decreasing costs to litigants it should enhance the value
of a patent and equalize the individual inventor with his corporate
counterpart. Finally, Congress and the public could scrutinize the
proposed system effectively. Patents of doubtful validity would no
longer cloud the Patent Office records indefinitely. The single
forum hearing patent cases could develop a coherent policy which
would be visible and thus subject to public criticism. These
benefits far outweigh any disadvantages the proposed system
might have.
The present system, on the other hand, must be judged by its
ability to accomplish the goals for which it was created:
[P]eople certainly have to be persuaded that they stand to get
something from the system if they use it. The chance of getting
the economic reward it holds out is so remote in both time and
to a reliprobability that people have to have something akin
122
gious belief in it or the system won't work at all.
122 Rich, supra note 28, at 697. Compare Markey, supra note 5, at 5 (from speech before
European Study Conference held in London, January 25, 1977). The speech purports to
be optimistic about the state of the American patent law system:
The current ferment surrounding massive legislative proposals for total overhaul of our patent system may well shake down into limited, but solid, long
range improvement.
Like the referees in boxing rings, judges must 'be neutral, favoring neither
boxer. Hence, I will have no comment pro or con any current proposal for
change in the system. Charged with the duty of interpreting and applying
statutory law after it is established, judges have no role in writing the statutes
and, unless requested by the Congress, no say in what the statutory law should
be. It is, on the other hand, perfectly proper, and perhaps useful, for a judge
to clear the existing legal air occasionally, to bring a little perspective to the
dialogue.
You may have heard recently what happened when the college girl wrote
her parents saying that she was living with a boy without benefit of clergy, that
she was pregnant, that she had flunked math, that she had been suspended
from school and was about to be expelled. At the bottom of her letter appeared
this P.S.-"Dear Folks, I am not living with a boy, I am not pregnant, I am not
suspended and I am not about to be expelled, but I did flunk math. I just
wanted you to have things in perspective."
The first thing to realize, ii gaining a perspective on what appears to be a
current disenchanment with the patent system in the U.S. is that the controversy is not new....
With that incredible "perspective" in mind (it would appear that Chief Judge Markey is
prepared to concede that the patent law system has "flunked math," so to speak ... ) he
concluded his remarks:
When all is said and done, if I were standing on the steps of the United
States Patent and Trademark Office and an inventor, foreign or domestic, approached me, I would say to that inventor, "Jump in. The water's finel"
Id. at 11.

